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INTRODUCTION
Every day, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon, ridesharing
companies, and numerous other service providers copy users’ account
information upon receiving a preservation request from the government.
These requests are authorized under a relatively obscure subsection of the
Stored Communications Act (SCA). The SCA is the federal statute that
governs the disclosure of communications stored by third party service
providers. Section 2703(f) of this statute authorizes the use of “f” or
“preservation” letters, which enable the government to request that a
service provider “take all necessary steps to preserve records and other
evidence in its possession” while investigators seek valid legal process.1
Section 2703(f) is clearly a valuable tool for law enforcement, and
one that investigators are loath to give up. According to the government,
it permits investigators to prevent the destruction of evidence in a
minimally intrusive way while seeking legal process.2 It is also a useful
means to obtain evidence because relying on § 2703(f) does not violate the
Fourth Amendment as it does not involve government action. Even if the
use of “f” letters does implicate the Fourth Amendment, the preservation
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1).
2. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 27 (Nathan
Judish et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Manual].
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of account information is reasonable because users have consented to the
preservation of their records through their acceptance of the service
provider’s Terms of Service.
Despite its legality, § 2703(f) is harmful to user privacy. Privacy
advocates argue that the provision is outdated, it is relied upon excessively
by investigators, and it circumvents privacy protections by avoiding
judicial oversight. The provision is textually inconsistent. Critics of
§ 2703(f) argue that it violates the Fourth Amendment because it lacks
traditional safeguards and because the preservation of account information
is an unreasonable seizure.
This Article aims to impartially present and evaluate both the
benefits and harms of using “f” letters as a law enforcement tool. Part I
provides the background of the SCA and places the statute in historical
context. Part II surveys various service providers’ Terms of Service and
Privacy Policies and provides statistics regarding the use of preservation
letters. Part III analyzes both the benefits and harms resulting from the
government’s use of “f” letters. Finally, Part IV suggests a remedy that
enables investigators to continue using “f” letters when appropriate while
also limiting the privacy harms that can occur under the existing process.
I. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

A. Erections, Warshak, and the Stored Communications Act
United States v. Warshak3 was the first case to pose a constitutional
challenge to the Stored Communications Act, and it illustrates the
conflicting interests of law enforcement and individual privacy.4 The
statutory privacy law regulates the voluntary and compelled disclosures of
stored content and non-content information held by third party service
providers.5 In this case the government was investigating Steven
Warshak’s company, Berkeley, for fraud. Berkeley’s principal product
was Enzyte, a pill purported to increase the size of a man’s penis. 6
3. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
4. Susan Freiwald & Patricia L. Bellia, The Fourth Amendment Status of Stored E-Mail: The
Law Professors’ Brief in Warshak v. United States, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 560 (2007). As Freiwald
and Bellia show in their insightful article, United States v. Warshak was a particularly important
decision in the development of electronic surveillance law because it involved a balancing of interests
between a user’s right to privacy in his stored electronic communications and the government’s
interest in gaining access to such information in order to pursue and prosecute a potential criminal.
Through its decision, the Sixth Circuit addressed not only the procedural hurdles that law enforcement
agents must overcome in order to obtain access to a user’s electronic information under the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) but also whether the SCA’s requirements satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
5. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11.
6. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 276.
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Berkeley advertised aggressively through suggestive commercials
featuring “Smilin’ Bob” and “a very happy missis at home.” 7 The
advertisement campaign, which claimed that individuals who took the pill
“experienced a 12 to 31% increase in the size of their penises,” cited an
independent customer study later confirmed to be fake.8 In addition, the
company falsified other statistics, enrolled customers in an auto-ship
program without their consent, and artificially inflated the number of its
sales transactions to maintain lines of credit from merchant banks.9 These
questionable corporate practices eventually caught the attention of
government regulators and investigators.
Because Berkeley personnel relied on e-mail for communication, in
October 2004 the government requested Warshak’s Internet Service
Provider (ISP) to preserve the contents of Warshak’s e-mails, as well as
all future messages.10 The service provider began preserving copies of
Warshak’s incoming and outgoing e-mails, and per the government’s
instructions, Warshak was not informed that his communications were
being preserved.11 In January 2005, the government obtained a subpoena
pursuant to § 2703(b) and compelled Warshak’s ISP to disclose all the
e-mails it had preserved since receiving the preservation request.12 The
government served Warshak’s ISP with an ex parte § 2703(d) order in May
2005 and mandated that the ISP turn over additional e-mails in Warshak’s
account.13 In total, the government obtained the contents of approximately
27,000 e-mails from Warshak’s account.14 Warshak eventually received
notice of the subpoena and §2703(d) order in May 2006.15
Seeking to exclude the e-mails the government obtained from his
ISP, Warshak argued that the government had violated § 2703(f) by
engaging in the prospective preservation of his e-mails and that the
evidence should be suppressed.16 The Sixth Circuit held that Warshak had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails and that the government
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by compelling his ISP to disclose
his e-mails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.17
7. Id. at 277; see also Associated Press, Company Touts Pills for Middle-Age Ailments, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6513891#.XfAsDZNKjq0 [https://perma.
cc/T8WR-2UT4].
8. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 277.
9. Id. at 271–81.
10. Id. at 283.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 335.
17. Id. at 288.
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Yet, the court sidestepped addressing the issue surrounding “f” letters by
holding that the e-mails should not be excluded from evidence due to the
government’s good faith reliance on the SCA.18 This decision has rightly
been recognized for extending Fourth Amendment protections to e-mails,
as well as for its implications for online privacy. To date, however,
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) scholars have largely
ignored the concurring opinion’s discussion of § 2703(f), the statutory
provision that the government used to preserve Warshak’s e-mails in the
first place. The concurrence was the first to recognize and discuss the
privacy issues that could arise from improper use of § 2703(f).
In his concurring opinion, Judge Keith expressed his apprehension
regarding the government’s use of § 2703(f) to “preserve Warshak’s
stored and future e-mail communications without Warshak’s knowledge
and without a warrant.”19 According to Judge Keith, “The plain language
of § 2703(f) permits only the preservation of e-mails in the service
provider’s possession at the time of the request, not the preservation of
future e-mails.”20 Further, if the service provider had not been compelled
by the preservation request to maintain all existing and prospective
e-mails, and had followed its existing policy, it would have destroyed
Warshak’s old e-mails in the ordinary course of business.21 But because
the government relied on § 2703(f) to compel that the service provider
preserve all of Warshak’s e-mails, “the government used the statute as a
means to monitor Warshak after the investigation started without his
knowledge and without a warrant.”22 Such conduct was troubling because
it was akin to “back-door wiretapping.”23 Judge Keith’s chief concern was
the government’s demand of prospective preservation and disclosure of
e-mails under § 2703(f). And though the majority’s decision prohibited the
government from using “f” letters to order service providers
to preserve records not yet created, it did not adequately analyze the
constitutionality of § 2703(f).
The following section provides the historical background of the
SCA. It also discusses 18 U.S.C. § 2703 and specifically focuses on the
language of subsection (f).

18. Id. at 292.
19. Id. at 334 (Keith, J., concurring).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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B. Historical Context and Background
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establishes “the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 While the “meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is relatively well-established for investigations
involving physical evidence,” the same cannot be said of searches and
seizures involving digital evidence.25 Congress enacted the SCA in 1986,
as part of the ECPA, after recognizing that the Fourth Amendment does
not provide adequate protection to digital communications.26 The SCA’s
purpose was to fill in some of the gaps created by technological
developments and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that had combined,
in the preceding two decades, to throw the then-existing state of privacy
protections into a flux.27

1. Searches and Seizures of Communications Prior to the Stored
Communications Act
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.28 A “search” under the Fourth Amendment occurs in two
situations: (1) a physical trespass, by the government, on to “persons,
houses, papers, and effects;” or (2) action by the government that violates
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.29 A “seizure” involves
“some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in
[her] property.”30
To determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable, courts look
to a two-prong test articulated by Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in
the United States Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States.31 The Katz
test asks (1) whether an individual has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that
subjective expectation as reasonable.32 If an individual has an actual
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable,
and the government has violated this expectation through its conduct or

24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 389 (4th ed. 2018).
26. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848;
see KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 623.
27. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–13 (2004).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 401.
30. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id.
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due to its failure to obtain a warrant, then the government has likely
violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.33
The Supreme Court has clarified that the Fourth Amendment protects
possessory and liberty interests even when privacy rights are not
implicated.34 This Article limits its analysis to seizures that impact a user’s
privacy and possessory interests. It will not discuss whether preservation
requests involve “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
A seizure is constitutionally valid if it is accompanied by a warrant
issued upon probable cause “supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.”35 Although the Katz test remains the standard by which we
analyze the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures, the Supreme
Court’s holdings in United States v. Miller36 and Smith v. Maryland37
created the third-party doctrine that curtailed some of the protections
created by Katz.
In Miller, the government subpoenaed Mitch Miller’s bank records
to use as evidence to prove he was engaged in criminal activity. 38 Miller’s
banks complied with the subpoena without notifying him. 39 The
government charged Miller based on the information it obtained from the
banks, and Miller sought to suppress the evidence, arguing the records
were obtained illegally and that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated.40 The Court held that a depositor does not have any expectation
of privacy in his banking records because he is revealing the information
to the bank in the ordinary course of business.41
In Smith, the victim of a robbery began receiving threatening calls
after she gave the police a description of the robber and his car, a Monte
Carlo.42 After seeing the Monte Carlo drive past her house, she informed
33. There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In certain
circumstances, a warrantless search or seizure may not be reasonable but will be deemed permissible
if the conduct falls within one of the recognized exceptions. Common exceptions to the warrant
requirement include (1) exigent circumstances, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–50 (2013);
(2) consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); (3) a search incident to lawful
arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969); (4) plain view, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); and (5) the automobile exception, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
34. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1992).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
37. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
38. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 440–43.
42. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
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the police.43 The police later spotted a man who met the description driving
a Monte Carlo.44 The police ran a search on the car’s license plate number
and discovered that the car was registered to Michael Smith.45 They asked
his telephone company to use a pen register to record the numbers dialed
from his home.46 When the pen register recorded a call from Smith’s house
to the victim, the police obtained a warrant, searched Smith’s house, and
discovered a phone book turned to a page with the name and number of
the victim.47 Smith sought to suppress the evidence derived from the pen
register.48 He argued that the police obtained the evidence without a
warrant thereby violating his reasonable expectation of privacy.49 The
Court disagreed with Smith. 50 The majority held that Smith did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy because even if he harbored a subjective
expectation that the numbers he dialed would remain private, this
expectation was not one that society would recognize as reasonable.51 The
Court stated that in general, people recognize that they convey phone
numbers to the telephone company in order to facilitate calls, and that the
phone company makes permanent records of the numbers they dial for
recordkeeping, billing, and other purposes.52 As such, “[a]lthough
subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”53
Together, Miller and Smith established the third-party doctrine,
which holds that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information they voluntarily reveal to third parties. The
decisions also indicated that the Fourth Amendment did not provide
sufficiently strong privacy protections in the context of third party records
and, by extension, the networked environment.
As the use of the Internet and e-mail communications increased, and
as individuals provided more information in the form of data to service
providers, it remained uncertain whether the Fourth Amendment applied
in the context of computer networks.54 The concerns raised by the thirdparty doctrine were further amplified because under the Fourth
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 738.
50. Id. at 742.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 743.
54. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 622–23.
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Amendment’s private search doctrine, an ISP or other service provider
(e.g., a telephone company) was authorized to search through the data in
its possession and disclose the fruits to law enforcement.55
In response, Congress passed the SCA to provide statutory privacy rights
that supplement the constitutional rights of individuals as relating to
searches and seizures.
C. The Stored Communications Act
In enacting the SCA, Congress sought to balance the privacy interests
of society—recently undermined and diminished due to the
third-party doctrine—with the legitimate needs of law enforcement to
access such information.56
The SCA is not intended to serve as a catch-all privacy statute; rather,
it is narrowly tailored to regulate the retrospective surveillance of
communications.57 The statute balances investigators’ needs against the
privacy needs of individuals in two ways. First, the statute limits the
government’s ability to compel service providers to disclose user
information in their possession. 58 Second, the statute limits the providers’
ability to voluntarily disclose user information to the government.59
Section 2703 regulates the former,60 while Section 2702 regulates the
latter.61 Though the SCA has other important sections that define the
relevant terms,62 regulate delayed notice,63 or establish remedies,64 this
Article will focus primarily on § 2703. Specifically, it will explore and
analyze § 2703(f), the subsection of the SCA authorizing the issuance of
“preservation letters” or “f” letters.
1. Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or Records
Section 2703 establishes the rules that the government must follow
in order to compel a service provider to disclose customer communications
or records. The SCA differentiates between electronic communication
service providers (ECS) and remote computing service providers (RCS).
An ECS is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the
55. See Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 27, at 1212.
56. See id. at 1214.
57. See id.
58. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 676.
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2702.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2711.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2708.
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ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 65 And a
RCS is defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” 66
These are the two types of providers regulated by the SCA. When the
government seeks to compel either an ECS or a RCS to disclose customer
communications or records, it must satisfy different legal standards
depending on whether it is seeking non-content or content information.
Broadly speaking, non-content information refers to records or other
information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.67 Non-content
information includes transactional records, such as network and telephone
logs,68 cell site location information (CSLI), 69 and e-mail addresses of
individuals with whom the customer has corresponded.70 The government
may gain access to this category of information either by obtaining
customer consent, a court order based on specific and articulable facts,
also known as a “2703(d) order” or simply “d” order, or a search warrant.71
A subcategory of non-content information, which has been deemed
less private and thus afforded less protection, is referred to as Basic
Subscriber Information (BSI).72 Because BSI is the least protected
category of information, the government may compel the disclosure of BSI
through an administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena.73 BSI was
separated from other non-content records in the 1994 amendments to
§ 2703(c). The legislative history of the amendments indicates that the
purpose of the separation was to distinguish non-content information from
more revealing transactional information that could contain a “person’s
entire on-line profile.”74 BSI includes the subscriber’s name; address;
telephone connection records or session times and duration; length of
service and the types of service utilized; telephone or instrument number,
subscriber number, or other identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address; and means and source of payment for such a device
(including credit card or bank account number).75 According to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), “[i]n the Internet context, ‘any temporarily
assigned network address’ includes the IP address used by a customer for
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
67. This Article will use the terms “customer,” “subscriber,” and “user” interchangeably.
68. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 680; DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121.
69. See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 607, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013).
70. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121.
71. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 680.
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
74. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 122; H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 17, 31–32 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3497, 3511–12.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(A)–(F).
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a particular session. For example, for a webmail service, the IP address
used by a customer accessing her email account constitutes a ‘temporarily
assigned network address.’”76
In contrast, content information concerns the substance of the
communication and encompasses the actual files or data on the account.
Contents, “when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, include any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication.”77 For instance, the content of
a text message is the actual text message; similarly, the body of an e-mail,
the subject lines of an e-mail, or a voicemail all constitute “content.”78
Content information is provided a higher degree of protection than noncontent information. To compel the disclosure of content information, the
government must obtain a search warrant or provide user notice in
combination with either (1) a subpoena or (2) a “2703(d) order.”79
In some instances, law enforcement may want to compel a service
provider to disclose certain information from a user’s account yet lack a
search warrant, “d” order, subpoena, or other valid legal process. Under
such circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) permits the investigators to direct
a service provider to preserve the records and other evidence related to the
account for ninety days, and potentially up to one hundred eighty days,
pending the issuance of valid and compulsory legal process.80
2. Preservation Requests and Section 2703(f)
Section 2703(f)(1) of the SCA states that a provider of ECS or RCS
“upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps
to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the
issuance of a court order or other process.”81 Such records and other
evidence may “be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended
for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the
governmental entity.”82
As has been noted by Professor Kerr, the language of this provision
is odd for several reasons: it contains both mandatory and permissive
language; and perhaps more importantly, it uses the term “records and

76. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 121.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
78. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 123.
79. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 679; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
80. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 129.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2).
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other evidence,” which is broader than “non-content information.”83 This
ambiguity leaves open the question of whether the government can
demand that a service provider preserve both content and non-content
information, or whether preservation requests apply only to non-content
information or metadata. In practice, most service providers who are
recipients of “f” letters preserve both the content and non-content
information of the relevant user account(s).
Section 2703(f) does not mandate a specific format for a preservation
request. Rather, the government may submit a request to a service provider
via a phone call, fax, or e-mail.84 A preservation request does not require
any degree of suspicion, need, exigency, or judicial approval.85 Upon the
receipt of a preservation request, the service provider must take all
necessary steps to copy and retain all existing records and other evidence
pursuant to the request.
As mentioned above in the United States v. Warshak discussion, a
preservation request does not authorize the monitoring and freezing of
prospective records and other evidence not yet created.86 The court in
Warshak permitted the freezing of prospective records only because of the
government’s good faith reliance.87 Section 2703(f) only permits the
government to request that a service provider preserve the records and
other evidence it already has in its possession. The government does not
obtain access to the information using a preservation request. The “f” letter
only preserves any existing evidence while the government obtains a court
order or other process.
Such preservation requests are often accompanied by a NonDisclosure Order (NDO), which permits the investigators to direct service
providers not to disclose the existence of the preservation request to the
user or any other person (other than necessary to comply with the request).
Alternatively, the “f” letter may contain a non-disclosure request in which
investigators simply ask the provider not to disclose the existence of the
preservation letter.88
Although the Warshak decision received much attention in the legal
community—especially among electronic surveillance scholars and
83. Orin Kerr, Opinion, The Fourth Amendment and Email Preservation Letters, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/
10/28/the-fourth-amendment-and-email-preservation-letters/ [https://perma.cc/MJV3-84YN].
84. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140.
85. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83; Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. in Support
of Defendant-Appellant Kaleb Basey at 6, United States v. Basey, 784 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2019)
(No. 18-30121), 2019 WL 829338, at *6 [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
86. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (2010); KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW,
supra note 25, at 700; DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140.
87. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
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practitioners—the public remains generally unaware of the regularity with
which the government issues preservation letters and the frequency with
which service providers comply with such requests. This is in spite of the
fact that the many service providers contain law enforcement exceptions
in their Privacy Policies or Terms of Service (TOS) and publish
“Transparency Reports” detailing the number and types of requests they
receive. Part II of this article surveys various service providers’ Privacy
Policies and Transparency reports.
II. PRIVACY POLICIES, TERMS OF SERVICE, AND TRANSPARENCY
REPORTS
Service providers that offer services to the general public and possess
users’ data often receive search warrants, subpoenas, preservation
requests, or other legal processes from the government. A service provider
may be required to disclose any and all information it possesses that is
associated with a specific user account or numerous accounts. This may
include content or non-content information. Such requests, especially if
for content information, will generally require a warrant.
Law enforcement entities are also authorized to demand that a
service provider preserve all records and other evidence related to an
account. In this scenario, the government will submit a § 2703(f) letter to
the service provider in question and request that all records and other
information related to the account be preserved.
In an effort to balance user privacy and investigatory needs, service
providers will often indicate in their Privacy Policy or TOS89 that they will
comply with legitimate legal process. Google, for instance, states: “We
will share personal information outside of Google if we have a good-faith
belief that access, use, preservation, or disclosure of the information is
reasonably necessary to: [m]eet any applicable law, regulation, legal
process, or enforceable governmental request.”90 Amazon claims it “does
not disclose customer information in response to government demands
unless [Amazon is] required to do so to comply with a legally valid and
binding order.”91 Facebook’s Data Policy explains that the company will
access, preserve and share [user] information with regulators, law
enforcement or others: In response to a legal request (like a search
89. This article uses the phrase “Terms of Service” to refer to Terms of Service as well as Terms
of Use.
90. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://policies.google.com/privacy#infosharing
[https://perma.cc/KL68-C64F].
91. Law Enforcement Information Requests, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=GYSDRGWQ2C2CRYEF [https://perma.cc/9KDK-2KZK].
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warrant, court order or subpoena) if [it has] a good faith belief that
the law requires [it] to do so . . . . Information [Facebook] receive[s]
about [a user] (including financial transaction data related to
purchases made with Facebook) can be accessed and preserved for
an extended period when it is the subject of a legal request or
obligation, governmental investigation, or investigations of possible
violations of our terms or policies, or otherwise to prevent harm.92

Similarly, Twitter’s Privacy Policy states that it “may preserve, use,
share, or disclose [users’] personal data or other safety data if [Twitter]
believe[s] that it is reasonably necessary to comply with a law, regulation,
legal process, or governmental request[.]”93 In its guidelines for law
enforcement, Twitter explains that the company accepts requests from law
enforcement to preserve records, that it will preserve a temporary snapshot
of the relevant account records for ninety days, and that it will not disclose
preserved evidence without valid legal process.94 In order for a
preservation request to be valid, Twitter requires the requesting agency to
sign the request, have a valid return official e-mail address, be on official
law enforcement letterhead, and include the @username and URL of the
subject Twitter profile.95 Such requests can be uploaded via a website
provided by Twitter.96
Though a service provider may preserve all information related to a
specified account or set of accounts pursuant to a § 2703(f) request without
informing the account user, service providers regularly tell law
enforcement that they will notify the relevant account user(s) prior to
disclosing content information. For instance, Amazon explains that
“unless prohibited from doing so or [if] there is clear indication of illegal
conduct in connection with the use of Amazon products or services,
Amazon notifies customers before disclosing content information.”97 Two
facts are important to highlight: (1) such statements typically limit user
notification to situations in which content information is being disclosed
and not where non-content information is at issue; and (2) law enforcement
92. Data Policy, FACEBOOK (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/policy.php#legalrequests-prevent-harm [https://perma.cc/8W3Q-WTD5].
93. Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER (June 18, 2020), https://twitter.com/en/privacy
[https://perma.cc/5DQT-KDYD].
94. Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
twitter-law-enforcement-support#6 [https://perma.cc/3WXM-XK2K].
95. Id.
96. See Legal Request Submissions, TWITTER, https://legalrequests.twitter.com/forms/
landing_disclaimer [https://perma.cc/8UD2-2KK4] [hereinafter TWITTER, 2016]. Facebook provides
a similar online portal through which law enforcement can “expeditiously submit formal preservation
requests.” Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/AM2D-YPPP].
97. See Law Enforcement Information Requests, supra note 91.
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has the option of including an NDO with its preservation request, which
prohibits the service provider from disclosing the existence of such a
request. An NDO, however, must be approved and signed by a court,
which generally requires law enforcement to illustrate to the court a certain
amount of existing evidence as to why the account must be preserved. This
ensures a degree of oversight by a neutral and detached magistrate thereby
protecting user privacy.
As noted above, service providers often include law enforcement
compliance information in their Privacy Policy or TOS. Nonetheless, users
rarely read or understand these policies. A Brookings Institution survey
found that three quarters of online users rarely read the TOS.98 Further,
according to the New York Times, the vast majority of privacy policies
exceed the college reading level, and over half of Americans may struggle
to understand these dense and lengthy texts.99 It remains questionable
whether users have a firm appreciation of how effortlessly investigators
can request the preservation of user account information and how
frequently service providers comply with such requests. As user awareness
of privacy issues has increased, companies have attempted to provide more
transparency regarding their privacy practices. One outcome is the
publication of Transparency Reports. Service providers may choose to
publish Transparency Reports disclosing the statistics about the quantity
and types of requests they have received. The next section focuses on
preservation request statistics published in Transparency Reports.
First, Google began reporting on the number of requests for user or
account information in the first half of 2011.100 As indicated by the data,
Google’s first indication of receiving preservation requests from law
enforcement is during the period between July 2014 through December
2014.101 During that time period, Google received 4,290 preservation
requests from investigators in the United States.102 That number has
98. Darrell M. West, Brookings Survey Finds Three-Quarters of Online Users Rarely Read
Business Terms of Service, BROOKINGS (May 21, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2019/05/21/brookings-survey-finds-three-quarters-of-online-users-rarely-read-business-terms-ofservice/ [https://perma.cc/YH2J-ENSR].
99. Kevin Litman-Navarro, Opinion, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an
Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019
/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-privacy-policies.html [https://perma.cc/KVG2-C9L3].
100. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview
?hl=en&user_requests_report_period=series:requests,accounts;authority:US;time:&lu=user_requests
_report_period [https://perma.cc/9NT7-6FCB].
101. This is according to the data available in Google’s Transparency Report. See id. It is
possible that Google did not maintain any data regarding the receipt of preservation requests prior to
this date.
102. Id.
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steadily increased during each reporting term with the exception of one
term. The number of preservation requests between January and June 2016
was 5,817; this figure dropped to 5,717 for the period between June and
December 2016.103 In its most recent reporting term (July 2018–December
2018), Google received 9,578 preservation requests.104 It is important to
note that a single preservation request does not necessarily seek the
preservation of a single user’s account; rather, a single preservation
request may seek to preserve information associated with multiple
accounts.105 As such, the actual number of individual user accounts
implicated in § 2703(f) requests is likely to be significantly higher than the
published numbers.
Second, Facebook provides a more detailed breakdown of the
information concerning data requests. Facebook categorizes the requests
it receives as “Preservation Requests” and “Preservation Accounts
Preserved.” At the time of writing this Article, Facebook’s data regarding
preservation requests covers the period between the first half (H1) of 2016
through the second half (H2) of 2018.106 According to this data, from
January 2016 through June 2016, the company received 31,894
preservation requests from law enforcement entities in the United
States.107 During this same period, the number for Preservation Accounts
Preserved was 56,714.108 Similar to Google, the number of preservation
requests to Facebook steadily increased during each reporting period since
2016, with the exception of H2 2017, during which the number of requests
decreased from 48,836 (H1 2017) to 47,127 (H2 2017).109 In its latest
figures (H2 2018), Facebook reveals that it received 56,404 Preservation
Requests and preserved information from 95,799 user accounts.110
Finally, Twitter has a similar story. It began providing preservation
request records in 2016, and the company explains that it received 1,283
preservation requests in H1 2016, affecting 3,311 accounts.111 By H2
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (“A single user data request may seek information about multiple accounts, so the
number of accounts requested may be higher than the number of total requests. Additionally, one
person can have multiple Google accounts, or the same account may the subject of several different
requests for user information.”).
106. Government Requests for User Data, FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY, https://transparency.face
book.com/government-data-requests [https://perma.cc/T5ME-3AE4].
107. Id. During this same period, Facebook received approximately 6,806 preservation requests
from other countries’ law enforcement agencies. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Transparency Report: Information Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/en/
information-requests.html#information-requests-jan-jun-2016 [https://perma.cc/E5FW-6TGB]
[hereinafter TWITTER, 2016 Report]. This number does not include preservation extension requests.
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2018, Twitter had received 3,265 preservation requests from investigators
in the U.S. with 1,187 accounts specified.112 This means that law
enforcement agencies were only able to identify about one-third of the
specified accounts for which they sought information.113 These figures
indicate that investigators often lack specific information about which
user accounts may contain evidence related to an investigation.
Further, since investigators need not meet the high threshold of a warrant
when issuing a preservation request, they appear to cast a wider net when
issuing such requests.
Part II provided some statistics as to the quantity of preservation
requests issued by investigators in the United States. The companies
examined are not the only entities which receive and comply with law
enforcement requests. Nor are they the only service providers that disclose
the statistics related to such requests. These companies were selected and
discussed primarily due to their market size and influence. Part III
discusses the policy and legal considerations surrounding § 2703(f).
III. POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Article has discussed the historical context and background of
the SCA, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), and the figures surrounding
the issuance of preservation requests. Part III aims to impartially present
and evaluate both the benefits and harms of using “f” letters as a law
enforcement tool.
A. Benefits of Section 2703(f)
Proponents of § 2703(f) make several arguments as to why
preservation requests, as the mechanism and provision currently exist, are
valuable and constitutionally valid. First, the existing regime guarantees
that potential evidence of a crime will not be destroyed or lost before
investigators can obtain valid legal process to compel the disclosure of the
preserved information. Second, it permits the government to preserve
evidence in a minimally intrusive way. Third, preservation of records and
other evidence does not constitute a search or seizure, and even if it does,
the user has consented to the preservation. Finally, the preservation
of account information pursuant to § 2703(f) is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
112. Transparency Report: Information Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/
en/information-requests.html#information-requests-jul-dec-2018 [https://perma.cc/NG5U-ZG4G].
113. See id. The total figures, which include preservation requests from other nations, are
similarly disturbing: the company received 3,970 account preservation requests, 1,514 of which
identified specific accounts. Id.
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1. Preservation Requests Help Protect Evidence
When § 2703(f) was drafted in 1996, the nature of the Internet,
electronic surveillance, and data processing and storage were vastly
different than today. It was common for a service provider to delete
account records every thirty to sixty days in the 1990s.114 As such, it was
sometimes necessary for investigators to request the preservation of
evidence while they obtained valid legal process.115
This was a real concern for law enforcement as acknowledged by the
DOJ: If “a crime occurs on Day 1, agents learn of the crime on Day 28,
begin work on a search warrant on Day 29, and obtain the warrant on Day
32, only to learn that the network service provider deleted the records in
the ordinary course of business on Day 30,” then the relevant evidence has
been lost and valuable governmental resources have been wasted.116
Section 2703(f) minimizes this risk by requiring a service provider
to freeze the records while the government presents evidence to a neutral
magistrate in the hope of obtaining a subpoena, warrant, or (d) order.
Should the government fail to do so, the service provider is free to
delete the records after ninety days, or one hundred eighty days if the
government obtained a preservation extension, thereby ensuring that the
government does not gain access to the preserved information without
valid legal process.
Having the authority to issue a preservation request while continuing
the investigation also provides investigators the opportunity to
comprehensively examine the evidence and reduces the burden on the
judiciary. A lot of time and resources could be wasted if investigators were
required to obtain judicial approval for a preservation request without first
being certain that the relevant records even exist. As the process currently
functions, investigators can request the preservation of records, investigate
further, and if relevant evidence exists, advocate for a neutral magistrate
to issue the legal process authorizing the government to access the records.
Alternatively, law enforcement may discover that the records sought do
not exist or do exist but do not contain relevant evidence. If the records do
not exist, then the issuance of a preservation letter does not cause any
harm; the service provider simply notifies the government that it does not
have any relevant information in its possession to preserve. If the records
do exist but are irrelevant, because investigators have not obtained access
to the data, they can refocus their inquiry elsewhere. In this case, the
service provider will delete the records in the ordinary course of business.

114. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83.
115. Id.
116. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 131.
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2. Preservation Requests are a Minimally Intrusive Process
In addition to protecting potentially valuable evidence, preservation
letters are also a minimally intrusive investigative method. A § 2703(f)
request does not preserve any content or non-content information
prospectively. It does not permit the disclosure of information to the
government without valid legal process. And, it offers a way to further
investigatory needs without interfering with a user’s use of her account.
As the court stated in Warshak, “the plain language of § 2703(f)
permits only the preservation of e-mails in the service provider’s
possession at the time of the request, not the preservation of future
e-mails.”117 This holding has been incorporated into the DOJ’s current
approach on searching and seizing computers and obtaining electronic
evidence. The DOJ Manual directs agents not to use “f” letters
prospectively to order service providers to preserve records not yet
created.118 This limitation is noteworthy. By restricting the preservation of
account information to the data the service provider has in its possession
at the time of the request, the provision ensures that the government does
not circumvent the higher standards prescribed for conducting real time
surveillance denounced in United States v. Warshak and that any privacy
intrusion by the government is minimal.
Moreover, a § 2703(f) letter does not, by itself, mandate the
disclosure of information; it only requires the preservation of existing
account information. A service provider is not obligated to disclose
preserved information—and is free to delete the information in the
ordinary course of business once the preservation request period ends—if
the government fails to obtain valid legal process. Consequently, a
preservation of information, by itself and without further disclosure, has
no bearing on the privacy of a user.
Preservation letters are also minimally intrusive because they do not
interfere with a user’s use of her account. When a service provider receives
a § 2703(f) request, it typically does not notify the account user, does not
restrict access to the account, and does not terminate the account. In fact,
the DOJ’s Sample Language for Preservation Requests states:
I request that you not disclose the existence of this request to the
subscriber or any other person, other than as necessary to comply
with this request. If compliance with this request might result in a
permanent or temporary termination of service to the Account, or
117. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (Keith, J., concurring).
118. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140. If agents want providers to record future
communications, they must rely on the pen register statute or the Wiretap Act. Id.
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otherwise alert any user of the Account as to your actions to preserve
the information described below, please contact me as soon as
possible and before taking action.119

Hence, the service provider will ordinarily make a copy of the
account information and maintain it for the duration of the request period.
This approach to preserving evidence is beneficial and constitutionally
valid for three reasons. First, it does not interfere with a user’s possessory
interest in her account since the user is not made aware that her data was
electronically preserved. If a user has no idea that her information has been
copied, and if the information is deleted without the government ever
gaining access to it, then the government has not interfered with the user’s
use of her account. Second, the service provider is permitted to delete any
copied account information if the government does not obtain valid legal
process. And third, the user is free to use or delete her account
as she deems suitable, even if a copy of the account is preserved by the
service provider.120
Section 2703(f) prohibits the government from preserving account
information prospectively or gaining access to the user’s data without
valid legal process. Even when account information is preserved, the user
may continue using her account. In fact, as evinced by the DOJ’s sample
language, the government endeavors to ensure the user is not made aware
of the preservation request and asks that the service provider not alert the
user when preserving the data in the account. Proponents of “f” requests
agree that these safeguards guarantee the preservation of account
information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is minimally intrusive.
3. No Government Action, No (Fourth Amendment) Problem
As federal law currently stands, the preservation of account
information is constitutionally valid because it is carried out by a private
entity and not the government. In order for the Fourth Amendment to
apply, the conduct at issue must be by a government agent. While private
parties can be considered a government agent for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, the government contends that a service provider
preserving account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is not
acting as an agent of the government because it is merely complying with
a legal duty.121 Accordingly, the preservation of account information
does not create an agency relationship and does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
119. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 225.
120. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83.
121. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 20, United States v. Basey, 784 F. App’x 497 (No. 1830121), 2019 WL 2234564, at *20 (9th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter DOJ Brief].
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4. Preservation Requests Are Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment
Even if there is an agency relationship, the government has argued in
a recent case that the preservation of account information is not a
seizure.122 The government further maintains that if a preservation request
constitutes a search or seizure, it is one that is reasonable and consequently
constitutionally permissible. Notwithstanding these arguments, the
government also believes that two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
apply to preservation requests.
A seizure involves “some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interest in [her] property.”123 Because a user
maintains unhindered access to her account despite the service provider’s
copying of the account information, the government is not meaningfully
interfering with the user’s possessory interest. So, according to the
government, preservation of account information is not a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
To determine whether searches and seizures are reasonable, courts
rely on the two-pronged Katz test mentioned in Part I. The government’s
position regarding the use of “f” letters is that users do not have a
subjective expectation of privacy because the TOS inform users that
service providers will comply with valid legal process, which may entail
the preservation of user account information. The existence of the thirdparty doctrine also supports the proposition that users do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their preserved account information.
According to this doctrine, individuals do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily turn over to a third
party. Since users willingly provide their information to service providers,
they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information.
Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
122. Id. at 21. In United States v. Basey, the defendant sought to argue that the long-term use of
“f” letters was unconstitutional. Id. at 10-14. In that case, the government relied on “f” letters to copy
and preserve the defendant’s account information for nine months. Id. at 21–22. The District Court
declined the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the use of § 2703(f) and
the defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 9. Though the Ninth Circuit declined to address the
merits of the constitutional argument and upheld the lower court’s ruling on procedural grounds,
Basey, 784 F. App’x at 497, in its brief to the Ninth Circuit the DOJ argued that a preservation of
account information is not a seizure, DOJ Brief, supra note 121, at 21-25. According to the DOJ Brief,
when the government sends out a § 2703(f) request, the government does not meaningfully interfere
with the user’s possessory interest in his property since the government “obtains no information at all,
and the account owner retains full and unhindered access to his account.” DOJ Brief, supra note 121,
at 22. Further, since the “f” letter “requires only temporary preservation of information . . . [t]his
temporary mandate does not constitute a meaningful interference with an account holder’s possessory
interest.” DOJ Brief, supra note 121, at 22.
123. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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seizures, and because users do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such information, their Fourth Amendment rights are not
violated by the government’s use of “f” letters.
The government claims that consent is the first exception to the
warrant requirement for seizures.124 It argues that consent exception
applies to preservation requests because if users want to use a service, they
generally have to agree to the TOS.125 Customarily, the TOS will contain
a provision that declares the company will share user information to
comply with all applicable laws and regulations. The government contends
that users, through their acceptance of the TOS, have consented to their
service provider preserving their account information.126 Because users
have consented, consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, and service providers have
common authority over the servers on which the account information
resides, the preservation of the account information does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
The second exception to the warrant requirement is one involving
exigent circumstances. Under this exception a warrantless seizure may be
constitutional if the government has probable cause to believe that the item
or place in question contains evidence of a crime, and it seeks to prevent
the imminent destruction of that evidence.127 Data is especially easy to
pulverize. It follows that § 2703(f) serves a compelling government
interest in that it permits electronic evidence, which can be “deleted
irretrievably in an instant,” to be preserved long enough for investigators
to obtain appropriate legal process under exigent circumstances.128
As the process currently exists, there is a strong and valid argument
that it provides a fair balance between a compelling government interest
in obtaining evidence and protecting the privacy of individuals. Records
are preserved only temporarily, are not accessed by the government
without the appropriate legal process, and the service provider can delete
copied records after the preservation period concludes. Preservation
requests do not apply prospectively, do not hinder a user’s access to her
records, and are generally minimally intrusive. Importantly, the
preservation of records by a service provider is not a seizure. Even if the
preservation of account information constituted a seizure, it is reasonable.
Because users have consented to the TOS and are on notice that a service
provider will comply with applicable laws and regulations, users do not
124. DOJ Brief, supra note 121, at 25.
125. Id. at 25–27.
126. Id. at 25.
127. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963).
128. DOJ Brief, supra note 121, at 28.
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have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their account information,
which is in the possession of the service provider. The preservation of
account information pursuant to § 2703(f) also falls within the consent
exception to the warrant requirement if a user has consented to the service
provider’s TOS. Finally, the ease with which a user can erase electronic
information—which may be valuable evidence of a crime—justifies the
warrantless preservation of electronic evidence by the government through
a preservation request under the exigent circumstances exception.
B. Harms of Section 2703(f)
Critics of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) maintain that the provision is outdated,
circumvents privacy protections by avoiding judicial oversight, is relied
upon excessively, contains textual inconsistencies,129 lacks Fourth
Amendment safeguards, and violates the Fourth Amendment because it
infringes on users’ reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a
seizure. The following subsections examine each of these assertions.
1. New Technology, New Concerns
Section 2703(f) was drafted in the 1990s. At that time, copious longterm storage by service providers was not possible. In fact, an important
milestone in data storage occurred in 1996 when “digital storage became
more cost-effective for storing data than paper.”130 In the 1990s, advanced
corporate hard-drives stored approximately two gigabytes of data.131
Today, consumer-friendly computers are typically equipped with 250
gigabyte hard drives, while corporate hard drives can store terabytes of
data.132 This growing storage capacity has correlated with users creating
significantly more quantities of data. In 2012, IBM estimated that “90%
of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years.”133 In
129. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83.
130. R. J. T. Morris & B. J. Truskowski, The Evolution of Storage Systems, 42 IBM SYS. J. 205,
206 (2003).
131. Rex Farrance, Timeline: 50 Years of Hard Drives, PCWORLD (Sept. 12, 2006),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/127105/article.html [https://perma.cc/JEE5-J62P]; Lucas Mearian,
Data Storage -- Then and Now, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.computerworld.com
/article/2473980/data-storage-solutions-143723-storage-now-and-then.html#slide8 [https://perma.cc/
XE2B-RKPH].
132. One terabyte is 1,000 gigabytes, one petabyte is 1,000 terabytes, and one exabyte is 1,000
petabytes. Storage capacity can be enhanced by using a Redundant Array of Independent Disks
(“RAID”), essentially putting together multiple hard drives.
133. IBM, What Is Big Data?, FACEBOOK (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.facebook.com/IBM/
posts/90-of-the-data-in-the-world-today-has-been-created-in-the-last-two-years/293229680748471/
[https://perma.cc/NJ4L-Y2K5]; see also Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day?
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2017, individuals produced 2.5 quintillion bytes of data.134 This figure is
likely drastically higher today given the growth of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices,135 and it will only continue to increase in large part due to the
rapid expansion of the technology industry combined with the ubiquity of
wireless networks and the industry’s decision to create more
interconnected smart devices.
This evolution of data creation and storage capability allows service
providers to store substantially more data for considerably longer
durations. This concern was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Riley v.
California.136 In that case, a unanimous Court acknowledged that most
adults now carry phones, which are capable of storing more sensitive
information for a longer duration. Therefore, allowing the police to search
a phone without a warrant is different from allowing them to occasionally
search an item or two.137
Accordingly, while relying on “f” letters may have been prudent in
the 1990s, their use may no longer be necessary.138 This is because thirty
years ago a service provider routinely deleted records every thirty to sixty
days.139 In today’s environment, however, a service provider can and does
store data for longer periods. Because companies now have the ability to
maintain user data for longer, the government has ample opportunity to
seek valid legal process and obtain the records using a warrant, (d) order,
or subpoena without the need to preserve the evidence using “f” letters. If
there are exigent circumstances and investigators are concerned that
certain records may be deleted or destroyed, the government may still rely
The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-statseveryone-should-read/#6c85825460ba [https://perma.cc/4T38-2XRF].
134. Id.
135. The Internet of Things has been defined as “the interconnection via the Internet of
computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive data.” Internet
of Things, THE NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d
ed. 2010); “The IoT is a giant network of connected things and people—all of which collect and share
data about the way they are used and about the environment around them.” Jen Clark, What Is the
Internet of Things?, IBM BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/
what-is-the-iot/ [https://perma.cc/8C29-WKTN].
136. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394 (2014).
137. Id. at 393–94.
138. It is also worth noting that many companies now rely on monetizing user data. As such,
businesses are incentivized to store any and all data for longer durations. See Abhas Ricky, What
Should Be Your Data Monetization Strategy to Compete in the Borderless Economy?, FORBES
(May 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/05/08/what-should-be-yourdata-monetization-strategy-to-compete-in-the-borderless-economy/#2048c7794095 [https://perma.cc
/YQH8-NURF]; Jathan Sadowski, Companies Are Making Money from Our Personal Data – But at
What Cost?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/31
/personal-data-corporate-use-google-amazon [https://perma.cc/L8ZJ-R5UV].
139. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 83.
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on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment in lieu
of looking to § 2703(f) to preserve account information. However, as the
law currently stands, law enforcement officers use preservation requests
because the process is simply easier.
Not only is § 2703(f) outdated but the privacy concerns it implicates
have become more common with technological advances. One such
example is the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data to
the information obtained through a preservation request. Big Data is a field
that allows for the analysis of extremely large data sets to reveal patterns,
trends, and associations. When the government requests the “preservation
of all stored communications, records, and other evidence” in the
possession of a service provider, it is potentially gaining access to an
extremely large data set.140 The government can consolidate these large
sets of data and use AI and other modern technology to create a detailed
log not just of a person’s movement—which was the concern of the
Supreme Court in Carpenter141—but also a detailed account of
all of a person’s activities, likes, dislikes, and opinions. This type of
surveillance may have been a worry of dystopian science fiction novels in
the past, but modern technology has made it a legitimate, palpable, and
fully realized concern.
2. The Preservation Request Process Lacks Judicial Oversight
The lack of judicial oversight is another concern. The Fourth
Amendment protects the privacy of individuals through various
safeguards. These include requiring the government to have probable
cause that a crime has been committed or that evidence of the crime is
present in the place to be searched or item to be seized; particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized;
requiring that there be a risk that evidence will be destroyed; mandating
law enforcement to seek legal process within a reasonable time; or
requiring oversight by a neutral and detached judge. None of these
protections exist under § 2703(f).
a. Probable Cause
One of the ways that the Fourth Amendment protects people and
places against unreasonable searches and seizures is by requiring that the
government obtain a warrant based on probable cause when searching or

140. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 225.
141. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see discussion infra Part IV.
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seizing people, places, or things.142 The concept of probable cause has
been interpreted as context-dependent, and the Supreme Court has defined
it as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.”143 Probable cause depends on the totality of
circumstances, and it is a threshold that the government must meet when
submitting an affidavit to a judge for a warrant.
Yet, § 2703(f) lacks this safeguard. The provision “gives law
enforcement the power to unilaterally, and without suspicion or judicial
approval, compel . . . service providers,” through a phone call, fax, e-mail,
or letter, to preserve their users’ account information.144 The text of the
statute provides no specific guidance for making a request. When issuing
a § 2703(f) letter, the government is not required to provide a judge with
an affidavit supporting a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be
found in the account records sought to be preserved. As such, a
preservation request does not satisfy the Supreme Court-established
requirement of proving probable cause prior to conducting a seizure.
The ambiguity of § 2703(f)’s language is also problematic. Whereas
most provisions in § 2703 refer to “content” or “records,” subsection (f)
refers to “records and other evidence.”145 As noted above,146 there is a
difference between content and non-content information or records. The
former is the substance of a communication, whereas the latter
encompasses transaction records, routing information, or logs.
Practitioners and scholars have analogized this distinction to a physical
envelope containing a letter; the content is the substance of the letter inside
the envelope, while the non-content information is the address on the
outside of the envelope. The service provider in this example would be the
post office or entity delivering the envelope. Clearly, the post office must
read the outside of the envelope in order to deliver it. Yet, it would be
inappropriate and illegal—absent the existence of exceptions or a
warrant—for the post office or law enforcement to intercept, open, and
read the content or substance of the letter.
But because § 2703(f) relies on vague language—i.e., records and
other evidence—it is unclear whether content falls within the purview of
the subsection. In practice, when a service provider receives a preservation
request it copies both the content and non-content information associated
with the account or accounts. Preserving non-content information without
a warrant is similar to a litigation hold. A company involved in a legal
142. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
143. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
144. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 3.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1).
146. See supra Part I.
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action may receive notice in anticipation of a lawsuit or investigation,
ordering it to preserve documents and other materials relating to that
lawsuit or investigation.147 This litigation hold temporarily prevents the
destruction of the company’s records and other relevant evidence in the
ordinary course of business and ensures the availability of such evidence
for the discovery process.
A service provider relies on non-content information when
conducting its business. For example, when a user posts a message on a
social media platform, the platform or service provider needs the routing
information in order to successfully transmit and publish that
communication. Though this non-content information relates to the
content created by the user, the user does not have ownership of the routing
or transactional information. As such, requiring a company to retain the
non-content information pursuant to a preservation request is deemed to
be within the bounds of § 2703(f).
In contrast, if investigators, lacking a warrant, request that a social
media company preserve the files uploaded by its users, they would
effectively circumvent the higher threshold for obtaining content
information. This distinction is important because while a service provider
may have control over the content since its platform is being used, the
content is in fact something that the user has a greater interest in and
actually owns (as opposed to the non-content information). Preserving
content information pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter is analogous to law
enforcement asking a landlord to access a tenant’s dwelling (or several
tenants’ dwellings), document everything inside, and preserve all the
documented information only for investigators to possibly return ninety or
180 days later to legitimize the initial warrantless entry. Though the
preservation of non-content information can be detrimental to Fourth
Amendment protections, the warrantless preservation of content
information is particularly harmful.
In showing that probable cause exists, investigators must particularly
describe “the place to be searched[] and the persons or things to be
seized.”148 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he manifest purpose of
this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches”149 and to
prohibit “the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.”150
This was the Founders’ response to the “general warrants” and “writs of
assistance,” which permitted the British King’s agents to carry out wide147. Litigation Hold, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
150. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
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ranging searches and seizures during the colonial era. The continued usage
of such writs, despite the Founders’ denunciation of these “worst
instrument[s] of arbitrary power,” ultimately contributed to the revulsion
against the Crown.151 This constitutional requirement has also been
codified; Rule 41(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that the
warrant identify the person or property to be searched and identify any
person or property to be seized.
Some circuits have established a multi-factor test to determine
whether the specificity or particularity requirement is met. The Ninth
Circuit, for instance, considers
one or more of the following factors: “(1) whether probable cause
exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant;
(2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which
executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from
those which are not; and (3) whether the government was able to
describe the items more particularly in light of the information
available to it at the time the warrant was issued.”152

In a traditional investigation of physical space or one involving
tangible evidence, determining whether the particularity requirement is
satisfied can be straightforward. For instance, if investigators believe that
evidence of a crime exists inside a home, they may seek a warrant to search
the entire house; however, a magistrate will generally not authorize the
government to seize all the contents of the house because such a warrant
would be overbroad.
Analyzing searches and seizures involving digital evidence on a
physical computer are more complex. “Most computer warrants are
executed in two stages. First, the computer hardware is taken away;
second, the computer is searched for electronic evidence. The physical
search comes first, and the electronic search comes second.” 153 Essentially,
investigators search the house or relevant location for the computer, seize
the computer, and perform the digital search at a later time. Imagine a
scenario in which law enforcement is authorized to seize a specific hard
drive and search for evidence of a crime. The physical seizure is
uncomplicated. However, the digital search and seizure are complicated.
Is the government authorized to search every folder and directory on the
hard drive, or must it limit its search to those files and folders that relate
151. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965).
152. United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[w]arrants which
describe generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the
items subject to seizure is not possible.” Id. at 1147–48.
153. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 25, at 548.
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to the investigation? Courts generally issue warrants that include a list of
specific items to be searched, accompanied by a “‘catch-all’ provision
allowing the seizure of any computer and electronic storage devices.”154
Such warrants have generally been held to be sufficiently particular,
thereby simplifying the physical and electronic search process.155
Applying the particularity requirement to the seizure of purely
intangible evidence is more challenging.156 The Federal Rules of Evidence
provide some flexibility for searching and seizing electronic evidence.
Specifically, Rule 41(e)(2)(B) sanctions a two-step process that authorizes
investigators, when possessing a warrant, to seize a storage media
containing electronic evidence for later review. The government, however,
must have a warrant to seize the evidence in the first place, a safeguard
that is lacking under § 2703(f).
As noted previously, there is no legally prescribed format for a
preservation request.157 When seeking to preserve account information, the
government typically issues a letter to the service provider identifying an
account or range of accounts by username, e-mail address, or telephone
number. While investigators are sometimes aware of the specific
identity of an individual whose account information they seek,
occasionally the government is only able to identify an account based on
an IP address. Therefore, the government is unaware of the identity of the
specific individual.
As mentioned in Part II, preservation requests do not necessarily
demand the preservation of a single user’s account; rather, a single
preservation request may require the service provider to preserve
information associated with multiple accounts.158 In the second half of
2018, for instance, Facebook received a total of 71,400 Preservation
Requests and preserved information from 119,600 accounts.159 Of these,
56,404 preservation requests were from U.S. law enforcement alone,
resulting in the preservation of information from 95,799 accounts. Data
provided by Twitter also reveals that the company has received 3,265
154. Id. at 554.
155. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009).
156. It is important to note that the particularity requirement only applies if the government is
searching or seizing people, places, or things. It remains debatable whether preserving information
pursuant to an “f” letter is a seizure. Infra Section V.B.5.e argues that preservation requests are seizures
under the Fourth Amendment.
157. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 140.
158. See Transparency Report, supra note 100. “A single user data request may seek
information about multiple accounts, so the number of accounts requested may be higher than the
number of total requests. Additionally, one person can have multiple Google accounts, or the same
account may [sic] the subject of several different requests for user information.” Id.
159. Government Requests for User Data, supra note 106.
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preservation requests from investigators in the U.S. in the second half of
2018; investigators, however, only identified 1,187 specific accounts.160
This means that the government was only able to specifically identify
about one-third of the accounts for which it sought information. The DOJ’s
Sample Language for Preservation Requests under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)
asks service providers to preserve “[a]ll records and other information
relating to the Account and any associated accounts.”161 This discrepancy
in the number of preservation requests issued and specific accounts
identified, as well as the DOJ’s broad language seeking the preservation
of information relating to the account and any associated accounts, reveals
that investigators are not sufficiently meeting the particularity
requirement. Rather, they are casting a wide net and hoping to capture and
preserve evidence potentially related to an investigation. In practice, this
leads to the seizure of a significant amount of irrelevant and private data,
thus running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Preservation Requests Are Used Excessively
Constitutional safeguards exist to curb government power, prevent
abuse, and ensure that if the government seeks to surveil an entity, it has
cause to do so. By requiring a subpoena, (d) order, or warrant that
mandates oversight by a neutral and detached magistrate and a finding of
probable cause, the Constitution and statutory laws make it more
challenging for law enforcement to surveil individuals or to seize and
search people or their property.
Preservation letters lack any such safeguards. They are often issued
without law enforcement having any suspicion, need, or exigency.162 In
fact, the DOJ recommends that investigators seek the preservation of
evidence as soon as possible when they have reason to believe that
electronic evidence exists.163 The government argues that it is simply
preserving evidence but not accessing it until it returns with valid legal
process. In reality, investigators often do not return with valid legal
process and the service provider destroys the preserved information at the
conclusion of the ninety (or one hundred eighty) days—or in the ordinary
course of business. Alternatively, “[w]hen investigators do return with a
court order authorizing a search of the targeted account, they commonly
wait months to do so.”164 Extending a preservation request, and even more

160. TWITTER, 2016 Report, supra note 111.
161. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 226.
162. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 2.
163. DOJ Manual, supra note 2, at 58.
164. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 6.
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so, returning with legal process, occur so infrequently that in one case a
court noted that
this is the first time the Court can remember the government
indicating it renewed its preservation request for the one-time,
additional time of 90 days, as allowed under § 2703(f)(2). It is also
the first time the Court can remember the government seeking a
search warrant within that one-time renewal period, as seems to be
the intent of subsection (f).165

As the practice currently exists law enforcement is simply using
§ 2703(f) to compel service providers to preserve a significant number of
online accounts “just in case a need for the information arises later in the
course of an investigation.”166 Facts and figures released by service
providers in Transparency Reports support this inference.
Facebook received 56,404 preservation requests from U.S. law
enforcement entities in the second half of 2018.167 In the same period, it
preserved 95,799 accounts.168 But the numbers for search warrants,
subpoenas, court orders, and (d) orders are significantly lower for the
second half of 2018. Facebook received only 23,801 search warrants
related to 36,652 accounts; 8,360 subpoenas for 13,728 accounts; 408
court orders for 510 accounts, and 786 (d) orders for 2,481 accounts.169
This shows that § 2703(f) is often used as a powerful tool by law
enforcement to arbitrarily preserve significant, and potentially irrelevant,
amounts of data without cause or necessity. Such conduct largely
sidesteps the procedural barriers put in place to prevent government
overreach and abuse.170
165. In re Three Hotmail E-mail Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916, at *12
n.78 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2016) (denying application for search warrant).
166. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 6.
167. Government Requests for User Data, supra note 106.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. In addition to these legal concerns, there are also significant financial concerns because
complying with preservation requests is often time consuming and costly. When a service provider
receives a preservation request, the company must first determine if it has any corresponding data. To
do so, it must have the appropriate technological infrastructure in place to query its database for the
information. If the company determines that it does not have the corresponding data, it must then
inform the requesting agency that such data does not exist. At this point, the requesting agency may
resubmit the request with further information, which would then require the company to once again
search through its database. If the company does have the relevant information, it must have the system
architecture in place to preserve the relevant data for up to 180 days (which takes up additional
resources) and, if the government returns with the appropriate legal process, to then disclose a copy of
the data to the government. Depending on the company’s policy, it may also be required to notify the
account user of the preservation request. In some instances, the preservation request may be overbroad,
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4. Preservation Requests Violate Users’ Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures. A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
when she has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and that
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.171 The
third-party doctrine under Miller and Smith severely diminished privacy
protections by establishing that individuals have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to a third party. Yet, a
recent case, Carpenter v. United States,172 appears to have limited the
third-party doctrine’s application in certain circumstances.173
In Carpenter, the government obtained Carpenter’s CSLI using court
orders. Using these records—which covered a 127-day period—the
government charged the defendant. Carpenter moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the seizure of the CSLI violated his Fourth
Amendment because the records had been obtained without a warrant
supported by probable cause.174 The Supreme Court held that the
government’s warrantless acquisition of the CSLI violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.175
The majority reasoned that the seizure of an individual’s CSLI was an
“entirely different species of business records—something that implicates
basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power
much more directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.”176 Of particular
concern to the Court was the government’s ability to use third party
records—CSLI in this case—to create a “detailed log of a person’s
movement over several years.”177 While a user’s account information may
not provide as detailed a log as would her CSLI, the data from an
individual’s account can be used to establish a person’s movements and
conduct over a period of time.
For instance, if the government requests that a service
provider—a social media platform, an electric scooter company, or a
which will require the company to push back against the government request and negotiate what will
in fact be disclosed. All of this requires significant time, resources, and legal sophistication. For this
reason, many companies choose to hire a subpoena compliance team who specializes in responding to
such requests, which, again, costs significant resources.
171. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
172. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
173. Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision, LAWFARE BLOG (June
22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision [https://
perma.cc/449J-NZSR].
174. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2208–09.
175. See id. at 2217.
176. Id. at 2222.
177. Id.
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ridesharing company—preserve a user’s account information, that data
can be used to establish a comprehensive record of the individual’s
movements. An individual’s movement can reveal a lot of details
regarding her interests and private life. This would arguably be in conflict
with the holding of Carpenter since the records are preserved pursuant to
a government request without a warrant.
One court has considered the applicability of Carpenter to
preservation requests. In United States v. Rosenow, the defendant, relying
on Carpenter, asserted that the government unlawfully seized his private
communications by issuing preservation requests to third parties without
a warrant based on probable cause.178 The government countered that the
preservation of Rosenow’s account was “not a meaningful interference
with the Defendant’s possessory interest in his account” because he “was
free to continue to use his account.”179 The court agreed with the
government and held that, because the “preservation requests in this case
did not interfere with the Defendant’s use of his accounts and did not
entitle the Government to obtain any information without further legal
process[,] . . . the preservation requests . . . did not amount to an intrusion
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.”180 Before addressing the
possessory interest argument,181 this Article will address whether users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their account information,
which would require the government to obtain a warrant, (d) order, or
subpoena prior to submitting a preservation request.
As discussed in Part II, users rarely read or understand TOS or
Privacy Policies.182 When individuals do read these documents the
majority of them may struggle to understand these legally sophisticated
texts.183 An individual who does not understand the TOS or Privacy Policy
of her service provider can reasonably argue that she had a subjective
expectation of privacy in her account. Nonetheless, courts are unlikely to
find that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy because society may
not recognize this expectation as objectively reasonable because virtually
all service providers require their users to agree—in some form—to their
TOS, thereby making individuals aware of the existence and function of
these documents. Critics of § 2703(f) may assert that average users do not
understand these documents as they are full of legalese. Because an
178. United States v. Rosenow, No. 17-CR-3430, 2018 WL 6064949, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
2018).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.5.b, IV.B.5.c.
182. West, supra note 98.
183. Litman-Navarro, supra note 99.
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average individual cannot understand the TOS or Privacy Policy, she
cannot provide informed consent to the terms and therefore has a
subjective expectation of privacy. Moreover, because the majority of
society is unable to fully appreciate the TOS or Privacy Policy, as well as
the implications of such documents, then an individual’s subjective
expectation of privacy may be objectively reasonable.
Alternatively, critics also argue that users have an expectation of
privacy in their account information because most take proactive measures
to prevent others’ access to their account. In United States v. Haydel, the
government searched Haydel’s parents’ residence pursuant to a warrant.184
In the course of the search, law enforcement discovered incriminating
evidence in a cardboard box located under the bed of Haydel’s parents.185
Haydel claimed that the records were seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and the court sought to determine whether he “had a
legitimate expectation of privacy for records secreted in his parents’ home
and under their bed.”186 Analyzing the facts, the court found that Haydel’s
parents had given him permission to use their home and had given him a
key, thereby providing him unencumbered access.187 The court stated that
Haydel owned the records that were seized and found that he “had the
authority to exclude persons other than his parents and their guests from
the home.”188 This, the court believed, made it sufficiently clear that
Haydel “exhibited a subjective expectation that the contents of the box
stowed under his parents’ bed were to remain private.”189 As such, the
court held that Haydel had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the area searched.190
Similarly, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their account information because they utilize access controls, such as a
username and password, to prevent others’ access to their account. Similar
to Haydel, where the defendant’s parents permitted him to use their
residence and provided him a key, service providers allow users to use
their infrastructure but provide users a “key” to access their own accounts.
Further, because users have unique login credentials and can exclude
others from their accounts, they clearly exhibit a subjective expectation
that the information in their account remain private. Therefore, users have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in their account information.
184. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1155.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because the
search warrant authorized the search and made the object of the search clear. Id. at 1158.
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Finally, if information obtained pursuant to a warrantless
preservation request is combined with Big Data analysis it may violate a
user’s legitimate expectation of privacy in her data. Modern technology
allows the government to use large sets of data to establish patterns, trends,
and associations, which can lead to an extremely detailed account of an
individual’s daily activities and interests. One cause of concern for the
majority in Carpenter was the government’s ability to use CSLI to obtain
information that “is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”191
If the government demands that a service provider preserve a user’s
account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request and subsequently
creates a detailed log of a person’s movements—something that is within
the capability of modern law enforcement—the individual’s legitimate
expectation of privacy may be violated.192
5. Preservation Requests Constitute Unreasonable Seizures
The preservation of account information pursuant to a § 2703(f)
request is a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes an
unreasonable seizure. A “seizure” involves “some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interest in [her] property.”193 This
interference must be by the government or its agent.194 A meaningful
interference does not necessarily require the government to search the
property; rather, preventing a user from using her property as she deems
suitable—which may include deleting the account information or
prohibiting others from accessing the information—also constitutes a
meaningful interference with property.

a. Account Information Is “Property” Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of “effects” has generally been
understood to extend to personal property195 and “possessions.”196 While
effects and possessions have traditionally been viewed as tangible items,

191. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
192. Even when the government gains access to the preserved information with a warrant, (d)
order, or subpoena, the evidence found in the preserved information may be considered fruits of the
poisonous tree because the initial seizure was without valid legal process.
193. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
194. Id.
195. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984).
196. State v. Davis, 929 A.2d 278, 295–96 (Conn. 2007); People v. Smith, 360 N.W.2d 841, 849
(Mich. 1984); Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 805, 828 (2016).
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various states, courts, and jurists have argued that the Fourth Amendment
protects both tangible and intangible property.197
The Texas Property Code has defined the term to include “property
held in any digital or electronic medium.”198 Other state legislatures have
also considered intangible digital assets to be property. For example, in
2007, the Indiana state legislature considered a bill that regarded electronic
documents as “estate property.”199 According to the ACLU, since 2013, at
least forty-six states have enacted “laws regulating fiduciary duties with
respect to digital assets, all of which explicitly recognize a deceased or
incapacitated user’s legal interest in access to their email
communications.”200 In addition to state legislatures, state courts have also
recognized intangible digital assets as property.
In Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., a Massachusetts state court declared that
an e-mail “account is a form of property often referred to as a ‘digital
asset.’”201 In Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, the court conceded that the
general rule at common law had only permitted converting tangible
chattels. But the court stated that the law, which has changed, allows the
conversion of intangible property rights and therefore permitted action for
conversion of a web account as intangible property.202
Given these developments and the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as related to digital assets, it is reasonable to
consider data—which encompasses account information—as property
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

b. Individuals Have a Possessory Interest in Their Account
Information
Individuals whose account information is preserved pursuant to a
§ 2703(f) request have a possessory interest in such digital assets.
Possessory interest is generally defined as the right to control property,
including the right to exclude others or to delete or destroy property.203
197. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-Mail,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 135 (2008). See generally Ferguson, supra note 196; United States. v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)
(finding that protections of the Fourth Amendment are surely not limited to tangibles).
198. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(12) (West 2017). Similarly, “Missouri amended its state
constitution in 2014 to protect ‘persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and
data, from unreasonable searches and seizures.’” ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 16.
199. Alberto B. Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to
Digital Assets, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 194 (2016).
200. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 17–18.
201. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 768 (Mass. 2017).
202. Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, 957 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
203. Possessory Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); ACLU Brief, supra note
85, at 15.
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One need not be the owner of property to have Fourth Amendment
protections concerning that property.204 Other factors—in addition to
ownership—that courts consider include:
whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing
seized . . . , whether he has the right to exclude others from that place,
whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would
remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal
precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately
on the premises.205

The right to exclude others is one of the fundamental elements of
having possessory interest in real or personal property and has been a
long-recognized principle of common law and jurisprudence.
William Blackstone recognized this right in his Commentaries on the Laws
of England.206 The Supreme Court has recognized this right in
numerous cases.207 And various circuit courts have also recognized the
right to exclude others as fundamentally valuable and a quintessential
property right.208
204. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980) (“While property ownership is clearly a
factor to be considered in determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated, . . . property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court’s inquiry.”).
205. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8 (“The only question remaining is, how this
property became actually vested; or what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a
permanent manner that specific land, which before belonged generally to every body, but particularly
to nobody. And, as we before observed that occupancy gave the right to the temporary use of the soil,
so it is agreed upon all hands that occupancy gave also the original right to the permanent property in
the substance of the earth itself; which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it.”).
207. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“One of the main rights attaching to
property is the right to exclude others and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”) (citing
BLACKSTONE, supra note 206); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (the right to
exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“In my view, that ‘right to exclude’ often may be a principal determinant in the
establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amendment interest.”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the
legal right to exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be
absolute; if the property is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified.”).
208. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“In the bundle of rights we
call property, one of the most valued is the right to sole and exclusive possession—the right
to exclude strangers, or for that matter friends, but especially the Government.”); United States v.
King, 227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts have considered a number of factors in identifying
those expectations which qualify for Fourth Amendment protection . . . includ[ing] whether the
defendant has the right to exclude others.”); United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 639–40 (2d Cir.
1993) (“One need not be the owner of the property for his privacy interest to be one that the
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Having a possessory interest in property also means having the right
to dispose of or destroy that property. In Buchanan v. Warley, the Court
held that “[p]roperty is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It
is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.”209
Similarly, in United States v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court
described property rights in a physical thing as “the group of rights
inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right
to possess, use and dispose of it.”210 To “dispose of” can mean “to get
rid of by throwing away or giving or selling to someone else,” or “to
destroy” the item.211
Users ordinarily protect their account by using login credentials (i.e.,
usernames and passwords), two-factor authentication, and other methods
to control access to their information. While a service provider may be
able to gain access to its users’ account, it would be atypical for a service
provider to do so without user notice and consent. It follows that users
have control over their account and property. Given the routine usage of
access controls, account users clearly expect and rely on the ability to
exclude others from their accounts.
Finally, users often have the option to delete their account
information—whether such information comprises e-mails, photographs,
or other content—or their account entirely. Certain service providers
differentiate between “deactivating” and “deleting” an account. For
instance, Facebook states that if a user “deactivates” her account, she will
be able to reactivate it whenever she desires and that “some information
may remain visible to other[ users].”212 In contrast, if a user “deletes” her
account, the user cannot regain access. The user’s information will not be
accessible while the account’s deletion is pending and copies of some
Fourth Amendment protects, so long as he has the right to exclude others from dealing with the
property.”); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that courts
consider “whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized . . . [and] whether he has
the right to exclude others from that place”); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 492 n.2
(4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“A Fourth Amendment seizure
occurs whenever ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in
that property.’ . . . In this case, the City significantly interfered with perhaps the most important aspect
of real property ownership—the right to exclude others from one’s property.”) (quoting United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it . . . .”) (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeish,
J., dissenting)).
209. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
210. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
211. Dispose (dispose of), THE NEW OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). As relating to
real property, the term can refer to transferring or selling the property.
212. Deactivating or Deleting Your Account, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/1253
38004213029 [https://perma.cc/C5MH-TLG8].
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material—which will be disassociated from personal identifiers—may
remain in Facebook’s database.213 Considering this distinction between
“deactivation” and “deletion,” a reasonable user may believe that she has
destroyed her account entirely, along with the information the account
contains, by “deleting” her account. If this user’s account information is
preserved pursuant to a § 2703(f) request before the account is fully
deleted, her possessory interest in that account has been interfered with.
Because users exert control over their accounts, and such control
entails excluding others from access to the account and its information or
destroying their information or accounts in their entirety, users have a
possessory interest in their digital accounts.
c. Preserving Account Information Meaningfully Interferes with the
Users’ Possessory Interest
When the government compels a service provider to preserve the
“records and other evidence in its possession,” the government is
interfering with the user’s possessory interest in her account
since the user is no longer capable of excluding others from her account,
deleting her account or the information within it, or exercising general
control over her account.
A meaningful interference can occur when the character or nature of
the property is fundamentally altered. Property owners are typically
authorized to exclude others from their property. Therefore, a meaningful
interference with an owner’s possessory interest occurs when her right to
exclude others is infringed on. In his dissenting opinion in United States
v. Karo, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), declared that the owner of
property has a right to exclude others—including the government—from
it, along with a right to use it exclusively for his own purposes.214
Investigators in Karo installed an electronic tracking device inside a
container without a warrant.215 While the majority held that the installation
of the tracking device did not amount to a meaningful interference with
the defendant’s interest in their possession, Justice Stevens argued that
“the attachment of the beeper . . . constituted a ‘seizure.’”216 By attaching
a tracking device to an individual’s property, the government had
converted the property to its own use and infringed on that exclusionary
213. Id.
214. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 708 (majority opinion).
216. Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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right.217 In other words, when the government attached an electronic bug
to the property, it profoundly altered the character of the property, which
resulted in a meaningful interference with the property owner’s possessory
interest. Whether the property owner becomes aware or not is irrelevant as
such knowledge is not required to constitute a meaningful interference.
Account information is comprised of intangible data—ones and
zeros. This data can be stored, transferred, or destroyed. When a service
provider preserves account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter, the
account user is usually not notified. Rather, the service provider simply
creates a new copy of the information contained in the account and stores
the new copy separate from the original. As argued above,218 account
information constitutes property despite its intangible nature. Because a
user is customarily not notified when a service provider preserves her
account information pursuant to a § 2703(f) request, the user has not
consented to the copying of her property nor has she consented to the
transfer of her property.219 Most users are apt to believe that they are
capable of destroying their account information should they choose to and
are likely unaware that a copy of their information has been created and
exists independent of their control. While a user can still delete the original
copy of her property, she is unable to destroy the new duplicate of her
account information, which remains her property. This is a meaningful
interference with the property of the user because the character of the
property, after a new copy is created, is profoundly different. Users believe
they are not only capable of excluding others from their data but that if
they were to delete their account information, their data will be destroyed.
By mandating a copy, the government, through its agents, has infringed
upon the users’ right to exclude others and destroy their own property.
Because the government has directed a procedure that deprives a user of
control over her data, it has meaningfully interfered with that user’s
possessory interest in her property.

217. Id.
218. See discussion supra Section III.B.5.a.
219. Some may argue that the law enforcement provision in Terms of Service (TOS) inform
users that service providers will comply with valid law enforcement requests and that, by agreeing to
the TOS, the user has consented. However, as argued previously, users often do not read the TOS and
their agreement to use the service is not always equated with consent to its terms.
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d. Service Providers Become Government Agents When Preserving
Account Information Pursuant to a Preservation Request
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscribes
only government action.220 It does not apply to a search or seizure, even
an arbitrary one, if performed by a private entity.221 The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures “if the private
party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government.”222 When the
government compels a service provider to copy account information
pursuant to a § 2703(f) letter, it is directing the private entity, thereby
making the service provider an agent of the government.
To determine if a private party is an instrument of the government,
courts examine two factors: (1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the private party
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further its own ends
through its actions.223 Both prongs must be satisfied in order for private
conduct to become a government action.224 When the government compels
a service provider to preserve account information pursuant to a § 2703(f)
request, the government clearly instigates the preservation and knows and
acquiesces to the conduct—i.e., the copying of the records and
other evidence in the service provider’s possession. Moreover, the
performing party, the service provider in this scenario, copies account
information pursuant to the government’s demand to assist law
enforcement and not for its own purposes. Since both prongs are satisfied,
the private search becomes a government search, and service providers
serve as government agents.
220. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has also consistently
construed this protection [of the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action; it is
wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual
not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental
official.’” (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
221. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
222. Id.
223. United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miller,
688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Miller, 688 F.2d at 657); United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (5th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737
(7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2011) (stating that relevant factors in “distinguishing private and government action for Fourth
Amendment purposes [include]: ‘the extent of the government’s role in instigating or participating in
the search, its intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search and the private party, and
the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the government or to serve its own
interests’” (quoting United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997))).
224. United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000).
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e. Preservation of Account Information Violates the Fourth Amendment
When the government requires a service provider to preserve records
and other evidence in a user’s account, the ensuing copying of the account
information without a warrant, subpoena, or (d) order is tantamount to an
unreasonable seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment.
A seizure involves some meaningful interference by the government,
or its agent(s), with an individual’s possessory interest in her property.
Because service providers involved in preserving account information
pursuant to “f” letters are acting at the behest of the government to further
a law enforcement objective, they are agents of the government. The law
enforcement objective in issuing a § 2703(f) letter is to preserve records
and other evidence in a user’s account pending legal process. To comply
with this demand, a service provider must make an exact copy of all the
information contained in a user’s account in the service provider’s
possession. The “records and other evidence” preserved comprise of data
created by the user. Although intangible, this data nonetheless constitutes
digital assets or property and falls within the meaning of “effects” as
described and protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Because account information is property, users have certain rights
related to such digital assets. These rights include the right to exert control
over this property, which includes the ability to exclude others from
accessing the data, as well as transfer or destroy the data. It is nearly
universally mandatory to protect user accounts with login credentials. The
purpose of such access controls is to exclude others from accessing the
account information. When a user protects her account with access
controls, she is exhibiting a desire to exclude others from her property.
Further, users often believe they can dispose of their data at will. In fact,
certain platforms’ ephemeral services are precisely the reason users utilize
such service.
For instance, Snapchat, Wickr, or Confide are services that provide
self-destructing messages. These platforms advertise that they enable
users to share content that will be automatically destroyed within a
particular time after the content is received. When a service provider
copies all account information pursuant to a preservation request, that
provider—acting as an instrument of the government—is profoundly
changing the nature of the property. In other words, the user believes that
her digital assets will be destroyed either within a set time limit or when
she chooses to dispose of the data. Yet, even if the original data is deleted,
a copy of the digital assets will continue to exist, thereby fundamentally
altering the transient nature of the property. Because a user is no longer
able to delete her messages and an exact copy of the data remains for the

2020]

Preservation Requests and the Fourth Amendment

147

government to use, the government has meaningfully interfered with the
user’s possessory interest in her property.
The warrantless seizure of account information pursuant to a
§ 2703(f) letter is unreasonable. The government may seize property
without a search warrant under certain circumstances. If the government
has probable cause to seize property, a case-specific exigency that requires
immediate police action exists, the seizure is temporary and proportional
to the nature of the exigency, and the government makes reasonable efforts
to obtain a warrant, then a warrantless seizure may be deemed
reasonable.225 As argued above, the government often lacks probable
cause when submitting preservation requests and merely hopes that the
preserved accounts contain potentially incriminating evidence. Further,
the data shows that the government often does not obtain legal process and
return to the service provider for the preserved information. This not only
demonstrates that a case-specific exigency does not exist but also that the
government often fails to make reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant. The
government’s seizure of all information relating to the account, and any
associated accounts, is likely overbroad and not proportional. Finally,
when account information is preserved, it is often not temporary. In some
cases, the government has copied and preserved account information for
nine months without obtaining a warrant.226
Proponents of the existing process for preservation of account
information may argue that the government is simply copying the
information pending valid legal process and that neither the government
nor the service provider search the account until a warrant has been issued.
Alternatively, the government may argue that it did not take possession of
the account.227 This argument lacks merit because the Supreme Court has
found that the Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one
involving ‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’”228 Accordingly, even when the
account information is preserved but not reviewed or searched, it
nonetheless constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.229 Therefore, the preservation of account information by a
service provider pursuant to a § 2703(f) request is a meaningful
225. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 18-30121 USA v. Kaleb Basey,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1UE8H52rTs [https://perma.cc/
RM98-Y52D].
226. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 1.
227. Id. at 20.
228. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
229. In Soldal v. Cook County, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that because the
government had not searched a mobile home after it seized and carried the mobile home away, it had
not violated the Fourth Amendment. See ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 21.
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interference with the possessory interest of the account user, constitutes a
seizure, and violates the Fourth Amendment.
IV. REMEDY AND CONCLUSION
Part III’s discussion highlights both the value of preservation letters
as an investigative tool and the legitimate concerns of privacy advocates
when law enforcement relies on § 2703(f) to preserve both the non-content
and content information of a user’s account.
A potential remedy that can balance the needs of the government and
privacy interests of individuals is to establish a process that enables
investigators to preserve account information while requiring the
government to meet a higher threshold when seeking the disclosure of the
preserved information. As the process for preservation requests currently
functions, the government requests that a service provider preserve all
account information for ninety or one hundred eighty days. The
government can then spend the ensuing ninety or one hundred eighty days
investigating further, finding a justification for the initial preservation, and
obtaining a warrant at the conclusion of this preservation period to gain
access to the content and non-content information.
The new process should mandate that investigators be aware of facts
establishing probable cause, or a lower threshold like a (d) order, at the
time the preservation request was made. Essentially, while investigators
can request the preservation of account information, they may not compel
the disclosure of the preserved data without proving to the court that the
government was aware of the facts establishing the basis for the legal
process they were seeking at the time investigators submitted the
preservation request. In other words, if the government requests the
preservation of evidence and submits a warrant to require the disclosure
of content and non-content information ninety days later, the government
must prove to the court that at the time it submitted the “f” letter it had a
reasonable basis to suspect that an account user had or was committing a
crime or that evidence of a crime was present in the account to be seized.
Similarly, if investigators seek the disclosure of information pursuant to a
(d) order, they must prove to the court that, at the time the preservation
was made, the government had specific and articulable facts showing there
were reasonable grounds to believe that the information to be compelled
was relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
This higher threshold makes a preservation request what it should be:
a mechanism to prevent evidence from being destroyed—evidence that
investigators can obtain but for the administrative delay of getting legal
process. Such a remedy would satisfy investigative needs while abating
the privacy harms suffered by users.

